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CASE COMMENT
BLEEPING EXPLETIVES: ADEQUATE PROTECTION OF THE
PUBLIC OR UNJUSTIFIED CENSORSHIP? FCC V. FOX
TELEVISION STATIONS, INC., 129 S. CT. 1800 (2009)
ChadM Muir*
The respondent and its affiliates aired two live television broadcasts
in which the "F-Word" and the "S-Word" were fleetingly uttered.' In
response to the offensive language, the petitioner released Notices of
Apparent Liability which deemed the fleetinf expletives actionably
indecent and held the respondent accountable. Such action marked a
change 3 from previouspolicy which weighed against finding indecency
for isolated expletives, and therefore the petitioner declined to enforce
sanctions.5 The respondent, in turn, petitioned the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals for judicial review of the order. 6 Following the petitioner's
voluntary remand, which allowed all parties to respond and air
objections to the charges, 7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals heard
*
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. I
dedicate this Comment to my wife, Jennifer, and my daughter, Jayne, in gratitude for their
unending love and constant support. Also, I would like to thank my parents and siblings for their
continual encouragement over the years.
1. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1808 (2009) [hereinafter Fox
Il]. The first incident occurred during the 2002 Billboard Music Awards, when singer Cher
exclaimed, "I've also had critics for the last 40 years saying that I was on my way out every
year. Right. So f*** 'em." Id. The second incident occurred during an award presentation at the
2003 Billboard Music Awards and involved an exchange between Nicole Richie and Paris
Hilton, principals in a Fox television series called "The Simple Life." Id. Ms. Hilton began the
interchange by reminding Ms. Richie to "watch the bad language." Id. However, despite the
reminder, Ms. Richie proceeded to ask the audience, "Why do they even call it 'The Simple
Life?' Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada purse? It's not so f***ing simple." Id.
2. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664, 2692 (2006) [hereinafter In re Complaints].
3. See id.; see also Fox Television Stations v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 446-47, 456-57
(2007) [hereinafter Fox I] (discussing the agency's ability to change its policy).
4. See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1813 (The Commission could rationally decide [that] it
needed to step away from its old policy where non-repetitive use of an expletive was per se nonactionable. . . ."); see also In re Industry Guidance On the Commission's Case Law Interpreting
18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd.
7999, 8003 (2001).
5. In re Complaints, 21 FCC Rcd. at 2692.
6. Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1808.
7. Fox I, 489 F.3d at 453.
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the case. Upon review, the Court of Appeals reversed the order9 on the
basis that the petitioner's reasoning was inadequate under the
Administrative Procedure Act'o to support sanctions for fleeting
expletives." The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari,
reversed and remanded the appellate court decision, and held that the
petitioner's new policy favoring a context-based approach, and its order
finding the broadcasts at issue actionably indecent, were neither
arbitrary nor capricious.' 2
Although licensed broadcasters enjoy "free and exclusive use of a
limited and valuable part of the public domain,"' 3 this benefit is not
without responsibility. Indeed, federal laws regulate the nation's
airwaves, 14 and these licensees are burdened by such "enforceable
public obligations" 5 as the indecency ban.' 6 This particular proscription
prohibits "utter[ing] any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communication,"' 7 between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10
p.m.' 8 Violations may result in fines, license revocations, and denials.19
The Supreme Court first addressed the proscription of indecent
broadcasts in FCC v. PacificaFoundation.20 In this case, a New York

8. Id. at 446.
9. Id. at 467.
10. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1966). The Administrative
Procedure Act sets forth the full extent of judicial authority to review executive agency action
for procedural correctness. See 5 U.S.C. § 706; see also Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 35 U.S. 519, 545-47 (1978). The Act allows the setting aside of
agency action that is "arbitrary" or "capricious." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
11. Fox I, 489 F.3d at 446-47. The majority was "skeptical that the Commission [could]
provide a reasoned explanation for its 'fleeting expletive' regime that would pass constitutional
muster." Id. at 462.
12. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1800, 1819 (2009) (Fox II).
13. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395 (1981) (quoting Office of Commc'n of the
United Church of Christ v. FCC, 35 F.2d 994, 1003 (1966)).
14. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994).
15. See CBS, 453 U.S. at 395 (quoting Office of Commc'n, 35 F.2d at 1003 (1966)).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464.
17. Id.
18. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2009); Action for
Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The statutory prohibition
applicable to commercial radio and television stations extends from 6 a.m. to 12 a.m.; however,
the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that because "Congress and the
Commission [had] backed away from the consequences of their own reasoning," by allowing
some broadcasters to air profanities after 10 p.m., the court was forced "to hold that the section
is unconstitutional insofar as it bars the broadcasting of indecent speech between the hours of
10:00 p.m. and midnight." Id. at 109.
19. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(k), 312(a)(6), 503(b)(1).
20. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).

2010}1

CASE COMMENT

333

radio station aired George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue during a
mid-afternoon broadcast. 21 In the twelve-minute monologue, Carlin, a
satiric humorist, listed various profanities and repeatedly used these
expletives in a variety of colloquialisms concerning sexual and
*22
excretory activities and* organs.
Upon review, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC or
Commission) deemed the monologue actionably indecent because it
used "language that describes, in terms patently offensive . . . sexual or
excretory activities or organs, at times of the day when there is a
reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 23 While
upholding the decision against First Amendment challenges, 24 the Court
noted that the content and total context of the incident was "allimportant" in making its decision. 2 5
In the years following Pacifica, the Commission has "cautious[ly],
but graduallv" 26 broadened its statutory enforcement against indecent
broadcasts. 2 The FCC took this trend2 a step further when it declared
that a non-literal use of the "F-Word" could be actionably indecent,2 9
21. Id. at 729-30.
22. Id. at 729.
23. In re Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Found. Station WBAI(FM), New York,
N.Y., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, *4. The FCC still uses this definition of indecent speech today. Fox II,
129 S. Ct. at 1806.
24. See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 745-5 1.
25. See id. at 750.
26. Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1806.
27. Compare In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 F.C.C.2d 1250, *4 (1978)
(explaining the Commission's "inten[tion] strictly to observe the narrowness of the Pacifica
holding," which "relied in part on the repetitive occurrence of the 'indecent' words" contained
in Mr. Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue"), with In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698,
2699 (1987) (repudiating the view that the Commission's enforcement power was limited to
"deliberate, repetitive use of the seven words actually contained in the George Carlin
monologue), and In re Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 FCC Rcd. 930, *2 (1987) (explaining that
the Commission's "highly restricted enforcement standard . .. was unduly narrow as a matter of
law and inconsistent with [the Commission's] enforcement responsibilities under Section
1464. ").

28. See, e.g., In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. at 2699 (explaining how the
Commission preserved a distinction between literal and expletive uses of graphic language
despite expanding beyond the "repetitive use of specific words or phrases."); In re Indus.
Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement Policies
Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8008 (2001) ("[W]here sexual or excretory
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting in nature, this characteristic
has tended to weigh against a finding of indecency."). See also supra text accompanying note
27.
29. See In re Indus. Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8002-03 (2001).
The "principal" factors to determine whether a broadcast is actionably indecent include the
"explicitness or graphic nature" of the material, the degree to which the material "dwells on or
repeats" the provocative material, and the extent to which the material was presented to
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even when used only once. 30
In the Golden Globes Order, NBC aired a live television broadcast
of an award ceremony in which Bono, a musician, used a single "FWord" while accepting an award.3 1The expletive was not "bleeped," or
edited out, even though technological advances made such edits easier
to accomplish without blocking or disrupting a speaker's entire
message.
After review by the full Commission,3 3 the broadcast was declared
"patently offensive" even though the Commission determined that the
word was used as an intensifier and not a literal descriptor. 34 The
Golden Globes Order noted that the "F-Word" was "one of the most
vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity."35 The
Commission reasoned that exemption of such language would "likely
lead to more widespread use." 36 Therefore, the FCC acted to "safeguard
the well-being of the nation's children from the most objectionable,
most offensive language."37 The FCC also explicitly acknowledged that
prior Commission action which suggested that "fleeting broadcasts of
the 'F-Word' were not actionable, was "no longer good law." 38
Despite expanding statutor37 enforcement of indecent expletives, the
FCC, an executive agency, is not without accountability through
judicial review. 40 This principle of oversight was applied in Motor
Vehicle ManufacturersAss'n of UnitedStates, Inc. v. State Farm.41
In this case, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA), an executive agency, issued an order which required newly
sold vehicles to be equipped with passive restraint systems. However,
"titillate," "pander," or "shock" the audience. Id. at 8003 (emphases deleted). "No single factor
generally provides the basis for an indecency finding." Id.
30. See In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the "Golden Globe Awards" Program, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4976 (2004) [hereinafter Golden
Globes Order].
31. Id. at 4975-76, 4976 n.4. According to NBC, Bono stated "This is really, really,
f***ing brilliant. Really, really great." Id. n.4.
32. Id. at 4980.
33. Id. at 4975-76.
34. Id. at 4979.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 4980.
39. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). See also supra text
accompanying note 10.
40. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 545-49 (1978).
41. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
42. See id.
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the order was later rescinded.4 3 Insurance companies petitioned for
judicial review4 and the Court found that "the agency ... failed to offer
the rational connection between facts and judgment required to pass
muster under the arbitrary-and-capricious standard."45
The State Farm Court ruled that a policy change need not be
justified by reasons more substantial than those required to adopt a
policy in the first place. 46 Instead, an agency need only acknowledge
change 47 and then scrutinize the relevant data and articulate a suitable
explanation. 48 In reviewing the justification, the Court "must 'consider
whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant
factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment."' 49 Indeed,
the Court cannot supersede the agency's judgment in favor of its
own."50 In fact, the Court should "uphold a decision of less than ideal
clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned.5 ' In this way,
executive agencies are subject to judicial review. 52
Similar to State Farm, the instant Court reviewed the FCCs 3 and the
adequacy of its explanation for a policy change that made the isolated
use of expletives actionable. 54 However, unlike in State Farm, here the
Court evaluated the adequacy of the Commission's explanation5 5 and
arrived at a different result.56 Ultimately, the Court determined that the
FCC's new policy and its order finding the broadcasts at issue
actionably indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious.5 7
While declining to apply any more searching review to agency
change, 8 the instant Court utilized State Farm and clarified what is
required for an agency change to pass judicial muster. 59 The majority
held that although an agency may sometimes need to account for certain
reliance interests on prior policy, it "need not demonstrate to a court's
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id. at 39.
45. Id. at 56.
46. Id. at 41-42.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 696 (1974).
48. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
49. Id. (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281,
285 (1974)).
50. Id.
51. Id. (citing Bowman, 419 U.S. at 286).
52. See -supranote 39-40, and accompanying text.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 41-52.
54. See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1813.
55. Id. at 1805.
56. Id. at 1819.
57. Id. at 1812.
58. Id. at 1810. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals seemed to apply a more searching
review. See id.
59. Id.at1810-11.
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satisfaction that the explanation for the new policy is better than the
explanation for the old."6 0 It is sufficient that a new policy is lawful
under statute, justified by good reasons, and believed to be an
improvement over prior policy. 6 1
Applying this standard, the instant Court reasoned that because the
FCC declined to impose sanctions and disavowed all prior agency
action as bad law, 6 the Commission realized it was changing its
policy. 63 In addition, the instant Court deemed the Commission's
rationale-namely the patent offensiveness of even fleeting expletives,
the futility of preserving a distinction between literal and non-literal
uses of profanity, and the desire to rid offensive language of any safe
harbors-reasonable in light of the circumstances.6 Indeed, the instant
Court acknowledged that providing a safe harbor for fleeting expletives
would likely cause such language to become more pervasive.6 5
Finally, the majority reflected upon the public policy implications of
its ruling.66 The Court pointed to the technological advancements which
make editing broadcasts easier.6 7 The majority noted that such
advancements further support enhanced enforcement policy.68 The
Court also focused on the importance that the policy change places on
total context.69 A consideration of the facts of each case will ensure
fairness in applying the policy across various broadcasting markets and
in different factual scenarios. 70 In short, the Court reasoned that the
relevant factors justified the decision.7 1 As a result, the Court reversed
the Second Circuit decision and remanded the case for further
proceedings.7 2
The dissent argued that the Commission needed to justify why its
73
prior policy was no longer sound, before it changed course.
Concluding that shifting policy without more in-depth explanation
imperils broadcasters and the public the dissent would have found the
FCC's policy change impermissible.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id. at 1811.
Id.
Id. at 1812.
Id.
Id. at 1812-13.
Id.
Id. at 1813.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1818.
Id. at 1818-19.
See id. at 1810, 1819.
Id. at 1819.
Id. at 1824-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1826.
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Overall, this interplay of arguments between the majority and
dissenting opinions portrays the delicate interchange of public policy
values that this decision seeks to balance. 75 It is the age-old tug-of-war
between two ideals: the government's protection of society and the
freedom from government intervention. The first ideal is often realized
at the expense of the second. In this case, the issue is the adequacy of
the government's justification for curtailing the broadcast of certain
speech.7 6 This decision will undoubtedly affect many groups in various
ways.
Perhaps one of the most obvious organizations affected by the
change in the law is the FCC. The instant Court's decision continues
the trend of the FCC's cautiously expanding statutory enforcement of
indecent broadcasts78 past the point of the Golden Globes Order.79
Because the Commission need only provide a rational and reasonable
justification for a change in policy,80 there appears to be little check on
the FCC's regulatory power. However, if the Court were to substitute its
own reasoning for that of the Commission's, then an entirely different
and perhaps even greater separation of powers issue would arise.8 2
Thus, there is an interplay between these constitutional and public
policy ideals. 83
In addition, while expletives "of a fleeting nature" or "made in a
fleeting manner" were not previously per se actionable,84 this is no
longer true. The removal of any safe harbor 86 for certain profanities
means that the FCC could see an increase in the overall level of
complaints, which in turn could affect the level of sanctions. In
addition now that Pacifica's context-based approach is the new
policy, the Commission's reviews could take longer, because the
Commission is tasked to weigh various factors.8 9 Overall, the instant
Court's decision opens the door to a variety of policy changes by the
75. See, e.g., Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1812-13, 1824-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
76. See id. at 1805.
77. See id. at 1819.
78. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
79. See Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4976.
80. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
81. See id. at 43.
82. See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring inpart and concurring in the
judgment).
83. See id.
84. See In re Guidance on the Comm'n's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broad. Indecency, 16 FCC Rcd. 7999, 8003 (2001).
85. See Fox II,129 S. Ct. at 1812.
86. See In re Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 FCC Rcd. 2698, 2699 (1987).
87. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744 (1978).
88. See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1812.
89. See id. at 1818; In re Complaints, 21 FCC Rcd at 13312.
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FCC.
The public is another group affected by the change in the law. The
Court's holding in Pacifica90 and in the Golden Globes Order91 portrays
its inclination to protect public interests, especially those of children.
The instant case reinforces this principle.9 Indeed, by making even
fleeting expletives actionable, the instant Court stops a slippery slope
that could lead to more pervasive use of profanity in media broadcasts,
and thus in society at large. 93
Finally, broadcasters who transmit these messages across the
airwaves will be affected by the change in the law. The instant Court's
decision means that broadcasters will be subject to greater regulation
and enforcement. 94 Even an isolated expletive may be actionable as
there is no longer any safe harbor provision. 9 5 As a result, broadcasters
may need to alter the way they operate, either by updating editing
technologies, increasing the delay in transmissions,9 7 or by changing
the programming that they transmit. 98 This could translate into greater
financial costs, which could also have a cascading effect on others.
Moreover, the ability of the FCC to change its policy means that
broadcasters must be able to adapt and transform to occasionally
changing public policy.
Overall, in an effort to protect the public and children, 99 the instant
Court has upheld the Commission's change in golicy which made the
use of fleeting expletives actionably indecent. o The instant Court's
holding effectively requires broadcasters to better monitor what they put
on the air and holds them accountable for any failure to comply with
FCC standards.'o' Although the holding balances a variety of public
policy issues, the more stringent regulation of broadcast programs
provides proper protection for families and gives conscientious parents
a relatively safe haven for their children.102

90.
9,1.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750-51.
See Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4982.
See Fox II,129 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
Id. at 1813.
See supra text accompanying note 27.
See Fox II, 129 S. Ct. at 1812-13.
See id. at 1818-19.
See id.
See id. at 1835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1812-13 (Majority opinion).
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1812-13; Fox ll, 129 S. Ct. at 1824-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

